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Abstract 
When 250 workers die in a fire at a Pakistani factory producing jeans for a German discount chain, 
when the work day lasts twelve hours in Cambodia’s garment industry or when workers commit 
suicide in Chinese factories producing electronics for international brands, should only the 
corporations in Pakistan, Cambodia, and China be held liable? What about the liability of their 
parent and subcontracting companies abroad? The United Nations increasingly recommends that 
states ensure that enterprises domiciled in their territory respect human rights throughout their 
extraterritorial operations. Furthermore, the United Nations and the OECD recommend that parent 
and subcontracting companies conduct human rights due diligence. Both developments are 
reflected in General Comment 23, which was recently adopted by the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights and relates to the right to just conditions of work. To date, however, 
there is no domestic law that specifically addresses the liability of parent or subcontracting 
companies for violations of the right to just working conditions of employees of foreign 
subsidiaries or suppliers. Although case law is emerging, much uncertainty remains about criteria 
establishing such liability. France and Switzerland are discussing legislative steps for clarifying 
corporate liability beyond disclosure requirements to ensure compliance with international 
recommendations. 
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Introduction 
One reason why multinational corporations transfer parts of their production to foreign countries 
is to save on production costs. When 250 workers die in a fire at a Pakistani factory producing 
jeans for a German discount chain,1 when the work day lasts 12 hours in Cambodia’s garment 
industry to meet the production targets of international brands,2 or when workers commit suicide 
in Chinese factories that produce electronics for international brands,3 should only the corporations 
domiciled in Pakistan, Cambodia or China be held liable? What about the liability of their parent 
or subcontracting companies abroad? 
This article builds on the increasing academic literature in business and human rights since the 
adoption of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP) in 
2011.4 Following the three pillars of the UNGP, this literature discusses the existence of and defines 
the scope of the state’s duty to protect human rights by regulating the extraterritorial activities of 
businesses domiciled in their territory or jurisdiction.5 It also defines the notion of corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights, which falls under the second pillar of the UNGP, by 
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clarifying the concept of corporate human rights due diligence.6 International human rights scholars 
have paid less systematic attention to corporate liability as a way to implement the third pillar on 
access to remedy. To date, the question of parent and subcontracting companies’ liability for human 
rights abuses committed abroad mostly remains in the field of tort law.7 Although NGOs and some 
human rights scholars are more closely linking the issue of corporate liability and corporate human 
rights abuses,8 it is recognized that meaningful progress has not been made with regard to the third 
pillar of the UNGP.9 
For the sake of definitional clarification, this article applies the UNGP terminology and refers to 
states’ human rights obligations, which include the state’s duty to protect human rights, and to the 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights. This article does not discuss the binding or non-
binding character of these obligations, duties, and responsibilities10 but rather intends to note the 
increasing number of references to them in international human rights law. By focusing on the 
specific human right to just conditions of work, this article aims to contribute to the debate in 
business and human rights by illustrating that domestic laws that establish the liability of parent 
and subcontracting companies that fail to respect that right extraterritorially are necessary in order 
to realize the state’s duty to protect the right to just conditions of work and to ensure access to 
remedies for affected workers abroad. 
First, this article presents the material scope of the human right to just conditions of work. Defining 
the content of that human right is necessary in order to determine the corresponding corporate 
responsibility to respect it and how parent and subcontracting companies should carry out due 
diligence in that regard. The second part focuses on the domestic implementation of the state’s duty 
to protect the right to just conditions of work by regulating the conduct of extraterritorial activities 
of corporations. It shows that domestic laws establishing corporate liability for parent and 
subcontracting companies for human rights abuses abroad are necessary beyond disclosure 
requirements to ensure access to remedies. Although there is an emergent case law in the United 
Kingdom, France, and the United States that addresses the liability of parent or subcontracting 
companies for violations of the right to just conditions of work of employees in foreign subsidiaries 
or suppliers, much uncertainty remains about the outcome of such proceedings. To fill the gap, 
France and Switzerland are discussing legislative steps to clarify corporate liability for human 
rights abuses committed abroad. 
1. The right to just conditions of work in a global economy 
The right to just and favourable conditions of work is a well-established human right. Its content 
has recently been presented in General Comment 23, adopted by the international Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) (1.1). Beyond a state’s duty to protect this right, 
international documents such as the UNGP and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises11 recommend that corporations 
respect it throughout their operations extraterritorially and carry out due diligence in that regard 
(1.2). Finally, UN treaty bodies increasingly recommend that states ensure that corporations 
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domiciled in their territory respect human rights, including the right to just conditions of work, and 
are held accountable for violations committed extraterritorially (1.3). 
1.1 The right to just conditions of work 
1.1.1. Legal basis 
The right to just and favourable conditions of work, along with the right to work and the right to 
join trade unions, is an economic human right. The very first draft of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UNDH) states the following: ‘[e]veryone has the right to good working 
conditions’.12 After amendment proposals from France,13 the USSR,14 and the Byelorussian Soviet 
Socialist Republic,15 among others, this human right was spread across two articles. Article 23 of 
the UNDH now guarantees that everyone has the right to just and favourable conditions of work; 
to equal pay for equal work without any discrimination; and to just and favourable remuneration, 
ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity. On the other hand, 
Article 24 states that ‘everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of 
working hours and periodic holidays with pay.’ 
The right to just conditions of work has been further clarified in Article 7 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which is reproduced here: 
 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work which ensure, in particular:  
(a) Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:  
(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of 
any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those 
enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work;  
(ii) A decent living for themselves and their families in accordance with the provisions 
of the present Covenant;  
(b) Safe and healthy working conditions;  
(c) Equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his [sic] employment to an 
appropriate higher level, subject to no considerations other than those of seniority and 
competence;  
(d) Rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with 
pay, as well as remuneration for public holidays. 
Furthermore, at the regional level, Article 15 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
states that ‘every individual shall have the right to work under equitable and satisfactory conditions, 
and shall receive equal pay for equal work.’ The right to just working conditions is further protected 
by Article 34(2) and (4) of the Arab Charter on Human Rights16 and Article 27(1) of the non-
binding Association of Southeast Asian Nations Human Rights Declaration.17 In the European 
context, the right to just conditions of work is not included in the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Rather, it is protected by Articles 2, 3, and 4 of the Revised European Social Charter18 and 
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Article 31 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.19 Finally, the right to just 
working conditions is included in Article 7 of the Additional Protocol of San Salvador to the 
American Convention on Human Rights.20 
The right to just conditions of work, as established in universal and regional human rights treaties, 
is not reflected in the International Labour Organization (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work.21 The ILO Declaration is broader in scope and encompasses 
freedom of association, the elimination of forced or compulsory labour, the abolition of child 
labour, and the elimination of discrimination in employment.22 Only the elimination of 
discrimination in employment reflects a part of the human right to just and favourable conditions 
of work.23 Although the lack of correspondence has been criticized,24 while also justified on 
practical and strategic grounds,25 Alston notes that ‘the list should include the right to a safe and 
healthy workplace, the right to some limits on working hours, the right to reasonable rest periods, 
and protection against abusive treatment in the workplace.’26 Despite doctrinal critics, the right to 
just conditions of work remains sustained, in practice, by several ILO conventions that provide 
practical guidance for its material scope. 
1.1.2. The material scope of the right to just conditions of work 
With regard to the material scope of the right to work, the Committee on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights has just released General Comment 23 on Article 7 of the ICESCR.27 Following 
the structure of Article 7 of the ICESCR, General Comment 23 identifies four core elements of the 
right to just conditions of work: fair, equal, and sufficient remuneration; healthy and safe working 
conditions; equal opportunity for promotion; and rest, leisure, reasonable limitation of working 
hours and holidays with pay. These four core elements are addressed one at a time. 
i. The right to fair, equal, and sufficient remuneration  
In General Comment 23, the CESCR identifies three criteria that must be considered when 
assessing remuneration. First, wages must be fair. Second, remuneration must be equal for work of 
equal value. Finally, it must provide all workers with a decent living for themselves and their 
families. 
With regard to the first criterion, a wage is fair when it reflects the responsibilities of the worker, 
the level of skill and education required to perform the work, the impact of the work on the health 
and safety of the worker, and specific hardships related to the work as well as the impact on the 
worker’s personal and family life.28 Turning to the equality criterion, remuneration shall not only 
be equal among similar jobs to avoid direct discrimination based on gender, race, ethnicity, 
nationality, migrant or health status, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, or any other 
grounds but also be equal when the work is completely different but nonetheless of equal value.29 
To avoid indirect discrimination, states are required to compare rates of remuneration across 
organizations, enterprises, and professions based on objective factors such as skills, 
responsibilities, and the required effort of the worker, as well as working conditions.30 
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Finally, remuneration must be sufficient to provide workers with a decent living for themselves 
and their families. In this regard, the CESCR has criticized wages that are too low to enable people 
to ‘live above the poverty line’,31 ‘cover the subsistence costs of a household’,32 ‘enable workers 
to meet their family’s essential needs’,33 ‘allow a modest standard of living’34 or ‘secure a standard 
of living with dignity’.35 General Comment 23 specifies further that ‘remuneration must be 
sufficient to enable the worker and his or her family to enjoy other rights in the Covenant, such as 
social security, health care, education and an adequate standard of living, including food, water and 
sanitation, housing, clothing, and additional expenses such as commuting costs’.36 In that respect, 
ILO Minimum Wage Fixing Convention 1970 (No. 131) provides further guidance. According to 
that convention, in addition to the needs of workers, their families, and the cost of living, a 
minimum wage should also consider the general level of wages in the country and the relative 
living standards of other social groups.37 That criterion thus combines considerations of basic needs 
with the relational aspect of fairness in wage distribution.38 
ii. The right to safe and healthy working conditions 
The second core element of the right to just conditions of work is the right to safe and healthy 
working conditions as described in Article 7(b) of the ICESCR. The CESCR interprets this 
provision as obliging states to prevent occupational accidents and disease as a fundamental aspect 
of the right to just and favourable conditions of work.39 
Referring to ILO Occupational Safety and Health Convention 1981 (No. 155) in its General 
Comment, the CESCR focuses on the adoption of national policies that address the design, testing, 
choice, substitution, installation, arrangement, use and maintenance of workplaces, as well as the 
working environment including tools, machinery and equipment, and chemical, physical and 
biological substances, and work processes.40 Moreover, national policies should incorporate 
appropriate monitoring and enforcement provisions and provide adequate penalties in cases of 
violations, including the right of authorities to suspend the operation of unsafe enterprises.41 
Finally, within the right to safe and healthy working conditions, workers affected by a preventable 
occupational accident or disease should have a right to a remedy, including access to appropriate 
grievance mechanisms, such as courts, to resolve disputes.42 
iii. The right to equal opportunity for promotion 
The third core element of the right to just conditions of work is the right to equal opportunity for 
promotion through fair, merit-based, and transparent processes. The CESCR interprets the notion 
of promotion in Article 7(c) of the ICESCR as also encompassing hiring and termination processes 
of employment.43 In those processes, there should be no place for irrelevant criteria such as personal 
preference or family, political and social links. This is highly relevant for women and other 
workers, such as workers with disabilities, workers from certain ethnic, national and other 
minorities, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex workers, older workers and indigenous 
workers.44  
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The right to equal opportunity for promotion is also closely related to the right to work in Article 
6 of the ICESR45 as well as to ILO Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation 
Convention 1958 (No. 111). That convention specifies under which conditions ‘inherent 
requirements’ to perform a specific job such as age, health or ‘security considerations’ may be 
lawfully invoked to deny an individual access to work. Finally, as far as termination of employment 
is concerned, ILO Termination of Employment Convention 1982 (No. 158), which also provides 
guidance, requires states to provide valid reasons for dismissal and guarantees the right to legal 
redress in the case of unjustified dismissal.46 
iv. The right to rest, leisure, reasonable limitation of working hours and holidays with pay 
The fourth and last core element of the right to just conditions of work is the right to rest, leisure, 
reasonable limitation of working hours and holidays with pay. In that regard, the CESCR also refers 
to ILO conventions to establish quantitative limits on work.47 The general daily limit should be 
eight hours.48 In cases in which legislation permits longer work days, employers should compensate 
longer days with shorter work days so that the average number of work hours over a period of 
weeks does not exceed the general principle of eight hours per day.49 Moreover, the CESCR notes 
that many state parties have opted for a forty-hour week and recommends that state parties that 
have not yet done so take steps progressively to achieve this target.50 Finally, all workers must 
enjoy weekly rest periods amounting to at least 24 consecutive hours for every seven-day period.51 
Legislation should also identify the entitlement of at least three work weeks of paid leave for one 
year of full-time service.52 
This section attempts to provide an overview of the universal scope of the right to just conditions 
of work as interpreted by the CESCR. However, regional differences may exist. In the context of 
holidays with pay, for instance, Article 2(3) of the European Social Charter guarantees four weeks 
of holiday with pay. The table below provides an overview of the main legal provisions in 
international treaties as well as in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that relate to at least 
one core element of the human right to just conditions of work. The table is not exhaustive and 
does not provide a qualitative account of the provisions. 
 
Fair, Equal, 
Sufficient 
Remuneration 
Safe, Healthy 
Working 
Conditions 
Equal 
Opportunity for 
Promotion 
Rest, Leisure, 
Work Hours, 
Holiday 
Hours of Work (Industry) Convention 
1919 (No. 1) 
   
Art. 2 
Weekly Rest (Industry) Convention 
1921 (No. 14) 
   
Art. 2 
Hours of Work (Commerce and Offices) 
Convention 1930 (No. 30) 
   
Art. 3, Art. 4 
Forty-Hour Week Convention 1935 
(No. 47) 
   
Art. 1 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
1948 
Art. 23(2), (3) Art. 23(1) Art. 23(1) Art. 24 
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Equal Remuneration Convention 1951 
(No. 100) 
Art. 2 
   
Weekly Rest (Commerce and Offices) 
Convention 1957 (No. 106) 
   
Art. 6 
Discrimination (Employment and 
Occupation) Convention 1958 (No.111) 
  
Art. 2 
 
International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights 1966 
Art. 7(a) Art. 7(b) Art. 6(1), Art. 
7(c) 
Art. 7(d) 
Minimum Wage Fixing Convention 
1970 (No.131)  
Art. 3 
   
Holidays with Pay Convention 
(Revised) 1970 (No. 132) 
   
Art. 3 
Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against 
Women 1979 
Art. 11(1)(d) Art. 11(1)(f) Art. 11(1)(b), 
Art. 11(2) 
Art. 11(1)(e) 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights 1981 
Art. 15 Art. 15 Art. 15 (?) Art. 15 (?) 
Occupational Safety and Health 
Convention 1981 (No. 155) 
 
Art. 4, Art. 5 
  
Termination of Employment 
Convention 1982 (No. 158) 
  
Art. 5 
 
Additional Protocol to the American 
Convention on Human Rights 1988 
Art. 7(a) Art. 7(e) Art. 7(c) Art. 7 (g), (h) 
European Social Charter (Revised) 1996 Art. 4(1), (2), 
(3), (4), (5) 
Art. 2(4), Art. 
3(1), (2), (3), (4) 
Art. 1(2), Art. 
20, Art. 27 
Art.2(1), (2), (3), 
(5), (7) 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union 2000 
Art. 23(1), Art. 
31(1) 
Art. 31(1) Art. 30 Art. 31(2) 
Arab Charter on Human Rights 2004 Art. 34(2), (4) Art. 34(2) Art. 34(1), (4) Art. 34(2) 
Promotional Framework for 
Occupational Safety and Health 
Convention 2009 (No. 187) 
 
Art. 2, Art. 3 
  
1.2 The corporate responsibility to respect the right to just conditions of work extraterritorially 
The right to just conditions of work entails four core rights: to fair, equal, and sufficient 
remuneration; to safe and healthy working conditions; to equal opportunity for promotion; and to 
rest, leisure, reasonable limitation of working hours and holidays with pay. While Article 7 of the 
ICESCR was meant to oblige states, in practice, corporations can greatly impact each of these core 
elements throughout their day-to-day activities. They may undermine these rights by providing 
insufficient wages, failing to prevent occupational accidents, hiring or firing in a discriminatory 
manner or imposing forced overtime. It is thus not a coincidence that international documents are 
increasingly defining the due diligence that corporations should apply with regard to the human 
right to just conditions of work as part of their responsibility to respect it. 
Although the concepts of responsibility to respect human rights and of human rights due diligence 
come from the second pillar of the UNGP, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
entail similar recommendations for corporations operating abroad. Furthermore, the ILO Tripartite 
Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy53 and General 
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Comment 23 delineate specific corporate responsibilities towards the right to just working 
conditions. Prior to presenting these specific corporate responsibilities, it is necessary to understand 
the due diligence that corporations should apply to human rights in general. 
1.2.1 General corporate human rights due diligence 
In the UNGP, due diligence is the central element of corporate responsibility to respect human 
rights.54 The same concept of due diligence is included in the OECD Guidelines, which specifically 
address the conduct of multinational enterprises in their global operations.55 Both documents entail 
practical recommendations on how corporations can contribute positively to human rights and 
avoid adverse consequences.56 Corporations are required to act in five steps.57 First, they should 
identify and assess actual and potential adverse human rights impacts;58 potentially affected groups, 
such as workers, should be meaningfully consulted.59 Second, the findings from the impact 
assessments should be effectively integrated across relevant internal functions within the 
corporation. Responsibilities for addressing such impacts should be assigned.60 Third, corporations 
should take the necessary steps to cease or prevent adverse human rights impacts.61 Fourth, they 
should account for how they address their actual and potential adverse impacts.62 Fifth, where 
business enterprises identify that they have caused or contributed to adverse impacts, they should 
provide for their remediation.63 
Regarding the necessary steps to cease or prevent such adverse impacts, both the UNGP and the 
OECD Guidelines recommend that corporations use their leverage to mitigate any impact to the 
greatest extent possible. ‘Leverage is considered to exist where the enterprise has the ability to 
effect change in the practices of an entity that causes adverse human rights impacts.’64 This applies 
to parent-subsidiary relationships and means that a parent company should take the necessary steps 
to prevent the impact caused by a subsidiary by using its leverage when it is able to effect change 
in the practices of that subsidiary. 
Moreover, the corporation should also exercise its leverage towards ‘business relationships’,65 
which include entities in the supply chain. The OECD Guidelines are particularly precise on the 
matter.66 Whether such leverage exists depends on the practical circumstances of the relationship, 
such as the structure and complexity of the supply chain or the market position of the enterprise 
vis-à-vis its suppliers.67 The extent of the specific steps to be taken depends then on factors such 
as the size of the enterprise, the context of its operations, and the severity of the adverse impacts.68 
For example, enterprises can influence suppliers through ‘contractual arrangements such as 
management contracts, pre-qualification requirements for potential suppliers, voting trusts, and 
licence or franchise agreements.’69 When suppliers potentially impact human rights, the enterprise 
may continue the relationship throughout the course of risk mitigation efforts; temporarily suspend 
the relationship while pursuing ongoing risk mitigation; or as a last resort, disengage with the 
supplier either after failed attempts at mitigation, or where the enterprise deems mitigation not 
feasible, or because of the severity of the adverse impact.70  
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1.2.2 Specific corporate responsibilities 
In addition to the due diligence that corporations should apply to human rights in general, the ILO 
Tripartite Declaration, Chapter V of the OECD Guidelines relating to employment and industrial 
relations, and General Comment 23 entail specific recommendations for multinational enterprises 
with regard to the right to just conditions of work. These corporate responsibilities are addressed 
in turn following the order of the core elements of the right to just working conditions presented 
above.71 
Regarding remuneration, both the ILO Tripartite Declaration and the OECD Guidelines 
recommend that wages offered by multinational enterprises not be less favourable to the workers 
than those offered by comparable employers in the country concerned.72 Where comparable 
employers may not exist, they should provide the best possible wages and conditions of work 
within the framework of government policies. They should at least be adequate to satisfy the basic 
needs of the workers and their families.73 
As far as health and working conditions are concerned, the ILO Tripartite Declaration recommends 
that multinational enterprises maintain the highest standards of safety and health within the 
enterprise.74 According to the OECD Guidelines, enterprises should ‘take adequate steps to ensure 
occupational health and safety in their operations.’75 Aware that multinational enterprises may have 
relevant experience, including knowledge of special hazards, they should make available 
‘information on the safety and health standards relevant to their local operations.’76 Furthermore, 
Article 16 of ILO Occupational Safety and Health Convention 1981 (No. 155) also requires 
ratifying states to impose direct obligations on employers to ensure safe and healthy working 
conditions.77 Employers are required to ensure that the workplaces, machinery, equipment and 
processes under their control are safe and without risk to health. Moreover, they are required to 
ensure that the chemical, physical and biological substances and agents under their control are 
without risk to health and to provide adequate protective clothing and protective equipment to 
prevent risk of accidents or of adverse effects on health.78 
Turning to the corporate responsibility to respect the third core element of the right to just working 
conditions, both the ILO Tripartite Declaration and the OECD Guidelines state that enterprises 
should be guided throughout their operations by the principle of equality of opportunity and 
treatment in employment and should not discriminate against their workers.79 Finally, there is no 
detailed reference to the corporate responsibility to respect the right to rest, leisure, reasonable 
limitation of work hours and holidays with pay. Corporations should nevertheless provide the best 
possible ‘conditions of work’, within the framework of government policies.80 
These corporate responsibilities to respect the right to just conditions of work are also included in 
the recent General Comment 23. The CESCR has made clear that corporate responsibility applies 
to all four core elements, although it emphasizes the responsibility to respect the safety and health 
of workers. Referring to the UNGP, General Comment 23 also specifies that ‘in situations where a 
 11 
business enterprise has caused or contributed to adverse impacts, the enterprise should remedy the 
damage.’81 The relevant paragraph addressing the corporate responsibility to respect the right to 
just conditions of work is reproduced here: 
While only States are parties to the Covenant, business enterprises … have 
responsibilities to realize the right to just and favourable conditions of work. This is 
particularly important in the case of occupational safety and health given that the 
employer’s responsibility for the safety and health of workers is a basic principle of 
labour law, intrinsically related to the employment contract, but it also applies to other 
elements of the right.82  
1.3 The State’s duty to ensure that corporations respect the right to just conditions of work 
extraterritorially 
The corporate responsibility to respect the right to just conditions of work extraterritorially would 
remain weak or even meaningless without states enforcing it. Regarding the question of 
enforcement of the right to just working conditions, the CESCR recommends that states ‘impose 
sanctions and appropriate penalties on third parties, including adequate reparation, criminal 
penalties, pecuniary measures such as damages, and administrative measures, in case of violation 
of any of the elements of the right.’83 Does this apply to corporations domiciled in the territory that 
violate the right to just conditions of work of employees in foreign subsidiaries or suppliers? 
According to the UNGP, states are not generally required under international human rights law to 
regulate the extraterritorial activities of businesses domiciled in their territory or jurisdiction nor 
are they generally prohibited from doing so.84 In that regard, the UNGP distinguish, although 
without much clarity,85 between ‘domestic measures with extraterritorial implications’ and ‘direct 
extraterritorial’ measures.86 While this distinction may be useful in explaining which measures are 
permissible in international law,87 it does not answer whether states have a duty to ensure that 
corporations respect the right to just working conditions extraterritorially. According to 
Augenstein, what should be decisive to trigger states’ extraterritorial human rights obligations is 
that the de jure relationship between the state and the corporation constitutes a de facto relationship 
of power of the state over an individual, within or outside of territorial boundaries, that brings the 
individual within the state’s human rights jurisdiction.88 
Beyond this doctrinal debate, prior to the UNGP, UN treaty bodies already interpreted human rights 
treaties’ obligations as including a state’s duty to regulate the extraterritorial activities of 
corporations domiciled in their territory or jurisdiction.89 Such references have continued to 
increase since.90 The CESCR in particular has adopted the practice of adding a specific paragraph 
to its concluding observations addressing the domestic regulatory framework that states have 
implemented or should implement to ensure that companies operating abroad fully respect 
economic, social and cultural human rights.91 The same duty is also laid down in Principle 25(c) 
of the non-binding Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations.92 Within their duty to 
 12 
protect economic, social and cultural rights extraterritorially, states must accordingly adopt and 
enforce measures as regards business enterprises, where the corporation, or its parent or controlling 
company, has its centre of activity, is registered or domiciled in the state concerned. This reflects 
the active personality principle as a basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction and, accordingly, a state 
may regulate the conduct of its nationals abroad.93 
In Europe, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has recently adopted a 
recommendation on human rights and business clarifying that question.94 The duty to protect 
human rights abroad has two dimensions. First, states should apply measures to require ‘business 
enterprises domiciled in their jurisdiction to respect human rights throughout their operations 
abroad’.95 Second, they should ensure access to remedies for victims of corporate abuses abroad. 
The recommendation is very precise in that regard. States should ensure inter alia that their 
domestic courts have jurisdiction over civil claims concerning business-related human rights 
abuses against business enterprises domiciled within their jurisdiction.96 This applies to parent or 
subcontracting companies operating abroad.97 Interestingly, the recommendation further suggests 
that states allow their domestic courts to exercise jurisdiction against a subsidiary as well,98 even 
if it is based in another jurisdiction,99 when such claims are closely connected with civil claims 
against business enterprises domiciled within their jurisdiction.100 
General Comment 23 is in line with these developments in international human rights law. 
Although it is not as precise as the Recommendation of the Council of Europe, the CESCR also 
interprets the right to just conditions of work as requiring states to regulate the conduct of 
corporations operating abroad and ensure access to remedy for victims abroad. Here is the relevant 
paragraph in General Comment 23: 
States parties should take measures, including legislative measures, to clarify that … 
enterprises domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction are required to respect the 
right throughout their operations extraterritorially … States parties should introduce 
appropriate measures to ensure that non-State actors domiciled in the State party are 
accountable for violations of the right to just and favourable conditions of work extra-
territorially and that victims have access to a remedy.101 
The present section shows that corporations have a responsibility to respect the right to just working 
conditions in their global operations and that states should enforce this responsibility by making 
sure that corporations are held accountable for violations of that right extraterritorially. In practice, 
however, how can a corporation be held accountable for a violation of the human right to just 
conditions of work when it operates through a subsidiary or a supplier abroad? This is a question 
of domestic implementation of corporate responsibilities to respect human rights and of 
enforcement in domestic courts, which is the subject of part two that follows. 
2. Domestic implementation of the corporate responsibility to respect the right to just 
conditions of work extraterritorially 
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For employees working in subsidiaries or suppliers of a multinational enterprise domiciled abroad, 
there are many hurdles to accessing remedies, even in cases of flagrant violations of their right to 
just working conditions. Beyond the costs of transnational proceedings and the procedural 
requirements related to jurisdiction and applicable law,102 a major legal hurdle is the universal lack 
of domestic laws establishing the liability of parent or subcontracting companies for the harm 
suffered by employees from which they benefit abroad. This part aims to show that adopting and 
enforcing laws establishing the liability of parent and subcontracting companies for human rights 
violations abroad are necessary to enforce the corporate responsibility to respect the right to just 
conditions of work extraterritorially. 
This section presents the few domestic judgements worldwide that have addressed the liability of 
parent or subcontracting companies for their failure to respect one or more core elements of the 
human right to just conditions of work of employees in foreign subsidiaries or suppliers. In the 
absence of laws clarifying such liability, courts are developing criteria based on existing domestic 
tort law. Applying tort law that is not equipped to address the parent or subcontracting company’s 
liability proves to be unsatisfactory, as plaintiffs and corporations face much legal uncertainty (2.1). 
Domestic laws clarifying the conditions of liability of parent and subcontracting companies for 
human rights violations extraterritorially are necessary. Such law proposals are currently being 
discussed in Switzerland and France. These proposals go beyond reporting obligations for 
corporations in the supply chains. They aim to incorporate the concept of corporate human rights 
due diligence in domestic laws and establish liability rules for the harm caused by parent or 
subcontracting companies that fail to apply such due diligence (2.2). 
2.1 Emergent litigation on the duty of care of corporations to employees abroad 
2.1.1 Parent company liability  
In English tort law, establishing a duty of care traditionally requires a three-stage test.103 The 
damage should be foreseeable; there should exist, between the party owing the duty and the party 
to whom it is owed, a relationship of proximity; and the situation should be one in which the court 
considers it fair, just and reasonable that the law should impose a duty.104 In Chandler v. Cape, Mr 
Chandler worked between 1959 and 1962 in Cape’s subsidiary, a factory producing asbestos. In 
2007, he contracted asbestosis as a result of exposure to asbestos dust during his period of 
employment. The appellate court explained how to apply this three-stage test to establish a duty of 
care for the parent company, Cape, to Mr Chandler, the employee of Cape’s subsidiary.105 Although 
Chandler was employed in a domestic subsidiary, this test applies without distinction to whether a 
parent company holds domestic or foreign subsidiaries.106 
To determine whether Cape had a duty of care to Mr Chandler, the Court highlighted that Cape 
was ‘clearly in the practice of issuing instructions about the products of the company’107 and that 
it appointed a doctor to conduct research into the link between asbestos dust and asbestosis.108 Cape 
conceded furthermore that the system of work at its subsidiary was defective109 and knew that the 
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business had ‘carried on in a way which risked the health and safety of others’.110 The Court 
concluded that ‘given Cape’s state of knowledge about the [working site] and its superior 
knowledge about the nature and management of asbestos risks, [there was] no doubt that in this 
case it is appropriate to find that Cape assumed a duty of care either to advise [its subsidiary] on 
what steps it had to take in the light of knowledge then available to provide those employees with 
a safe system of work or to ensure that those steps were taken.’111 
Summing up its findings, the Court developed four criteria to help with applying the foreseeability, 
proximity, and reasonableness test to establish the duty of care of a parent company to the 
employees of a subsidiary:  
(1) [T]he businesses of the parent and subsidiary are in a relevant respect the same; (2) 
the parent has, or ought to have, superior knowledge on some relevant aspect of health 
and safety in the particular industry; (3) the subsidiary's system of work is unsafe as 
the parent company knew, or ought to have known; and (4) the parent knew or ought 
to have foreseen that the subsidiary or its employees would rely on its using that 
superior knowledge for the employees’ protection. For the purposes of (4) it is not 
necessary to show that the parent is in the practice of intervening in the health and 
safety policies of the subsidiary. The court will look at the relationship between the 
companies more widely. The court may find that element (4) is established where the 
evidence shows that the parent has a practice of intervening in the trading operations 
of the subsidiary, for example production and funding issues.112 
Two years later in Thompson v. Renwick, the appellate court applied those criteria to Renwick, the 
parent company of a subsidiary for which Mr Thompson worked. Mr Thompson was also exposed 
to asbestos dust in his work, and as a result, had been seriously incapacitated by diffuse pleural 
thickening.113 Reversing the trial court’s decision establishing Renwick’s duty of care, the appellate 
court found that there was no evidence that Renwick ‘at any time carried on any business at all 
apart from that of holding shares in other companies.’114 The first of the four criteria established in 
Chandler v. Cape, according to which the businesses of the parent and subsidiary must be in a 
relevant respect the same, was thus not satisfied. Furthermore, there was no basis upon which it 
could be asserted that Renwick ‘either did have or should have had any knowledge of that risk 
superior to that which the subsidiaries could be expected to have.’115 The Court insisted that 
Renwick was a mere holding company and rejected its duty of care with regard to employees of its 
subsidiary. 
In the French case Venel v. Areva, the Tribunal des Affaires de Sécurité Sociale de Melun 
established the circumstances under which a parent company can be, next to the subsidiary, a co-
employer and accordingly have a duty to ensure that employees are protected against work-related 
illnesses.116 Mr Venel worked for the Cominak uranium-processing factory in Niger. He contracted 
lung cancer and asked the parent company, Areva, for compensation, claiming Areva held a duty 
to ensure protective health measures as a co-employer. The tribunal came to the conclusion that 
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Areva was effectively a co-employer on the grounds that it held shares in Cominak and was the 
concession holder of the mine exploited by Cominak; that Cominak had a postal address in France 
at the headquarters of Areva; that both Areva and Cominak conducted identical activities and 
exploited the same mining site; that Areva, as an expert in the nuclear industry, could not ignore 
the risks for employees; and finally that Areva had established a local observatory for the health of 
workers in uranium mines.117 
The Cour d’Appel de Paris granted Areva’s appeal. It found that to be co-employer there must be 
an intermingling of activities, interest, and management with the contractual employer. This was 
not the case as Cominak was not technically a controlled subsidiary of Areva, which held only 34% 
of its shares. Areva did not hold the majority of seats on the board of directors of Cominak, which 
remained autonomous in its management. The fact that both shared a common postal address and 
that Areva held the concession to exploit the mine was insufficient. Finally, the fact that Areva 
agreed to implement local observatories could not provide evidence that Areva recognized its status 
as employer. The Court concluded that Areva was not a co-employer and thus had no duty to 
safeguard Mr Venel’s health while working at Cominak.118 
One lesson from these three cases is the uncertainty about criteria that establish a parent company’s 
duty to protect the health of employees in a subsidiary. The first-instance decisions relating to 
Thompson and Venel clearly established a duty of care for the parent company. Based on the same 
evidence, however, the appellate courts clearly rejected such a duty. A second lesson is that the 
courts did not frame the matter or the health of the workers within the human right to just conditions 
of working. They also did not contextualize the matter within the current discussions in business 
and human rights. The courts did not refer to any international standards to assess the conduct of 
the multinational corporation. This resulted in the creation of criteria in Chandler and Venel that, 
although interesting, were unpredictable.. 
In future cases dealing with the health of workers in subsidiaries, courts should first place the matter 
within the framework of corporate responsibility to respect the right to just conditions of work 
extraterritorially. If the facts occurred after the adoption of the UNGP and the OECD Guidelines, 
they should then orient their criteria to this available international standard for corporate due 
diligence. Accordingly, courts should first look at whether parent companies have identified and 
assessed the risk of an adverse impact on the health of employees in their foreign subsidiaries and 
whether they have assigned responsibilities within the corporation accordingly.119 It is difficult to 
ascertain the extent to which the appointment of a doctor by the parent company to research 
asbestos dust in Chandler v. Cape helped the court to establish Cape’s duty of care. In any case, 
appointing a doctor is a way to fulfil the duty to identify risk. It should not be regarded as evidence 
that such a duty exists, which would otherwise reward parent companies that do not inform 
themselves about risks in their subsidiaries.120 By specifying that a parent company does not need 
to have but only ought to have superior knowledge on some relevant aspect of health and safety,121 
the court of appeals in Chandler nonetheless made clear that a duty to identify risk may exist 
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regardless of whether a parent company has taken steps to identify the risk, which is in line with 
the international due diligence standard. 
Furthermore, the UNGP and the OECD Guidelines recommend that parent companies use leverage 
to mitigate any impact to the greatest extent possible.122 Leverage means the ability to effect change 
in the practices of another entity, including a subsidiary.123 In that respect, in Chandler v. Cape, 
the court stated that it was not necessary to show that the parent company was in the practice of 
intervening in the health and safety policies of the subsidiary.124 It may be enough to have evidence 
that shows that the parent company has a practice of intervening in the trading operations of the 
subsidiary, which proves a potential ability to intervene,125 and thus an ability to effect change. To 
the contrary, the number of shares alone should not be enough to infer leverage. If a presumption 
of leverage for any parent company owning a majority of shares exists, a practical test must be 
applied to corporations holding less than a majority to establish their ability to effect change in the 
conduct of the subsidiary. Strong evidence in Venel v. Areva showed that Areva had the ability to 
effect change in the practice of Cominak,126 although it had less than the majority of shares. Had 
the appellate court oriented its finding to the international due diligence standard and the concept 
of leverage, it perhaps would have confirmed the views of the lower court. The same test of the 
practical ability to effect change must be applied to subcontracting companies, which is the subject 
of the next section. 
2.1.2 Liability of subcontracting companies 
Due diligence in the UNGP and the OECD Guidelines also applies to subcontracting companies 
with regard to their suppliers. The matter of Doe v. Wal-Mart shows the criteria developed by a 
U.S. court in 2009, prior to the UNGP, in order to establish the liability of a subcontracting 
company for the harm suffered by employees of foreign suppliers. In Doe v. Wal-Mart, the 
plaintiffs were employees of companies located in China, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Swaziland, and 
Nicaragua that sold goods to Wal-Mart. They relied on a code of conduct included in Wal-Mart’s 
supply contracts, specifying basic labour standards that suppliers must meet.127 The standards from 
the code of conduct required foreign suppliers to adhere to local laws and local industry standards 
regarding working conditions such as pay, hours, forced labour or discrimination, and included 
Wal-Mart’s right to conduct on-site inspections of production facilities. The workers alleged that 
Wal-Mart did not adequately monitor its suppliers and that it knew its suppliers often violated said 
standards. They further alleged that short deadlines and low prices in Wal-Mart’s supply contracts 
forced suppliers to violate standards in order to satisfy the terms of the contracts.128 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the supply contracts did not intend to protect 
the workers and that no such duty emerged from the code of conduct. The language and structure 
of the code of conduct only showed that Wal-Mart reserved the right to inspect the suppliers, but 
did not adopt a duty to inspect them.129 Furthermore, the Court found, as in Venel, that Wal-Mart 
was not the plaintiffs’ joint employer. According to the Court, a joint employer must have ‘the right 
to control and direct the activities of the person rendering service, or the manner and method in 
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which the work is performed.’ The Court added that ‘the right to control employment requires … a 
comprehensive and immediate level of “day-to-day” authority over employment decisions.’130 In 
practice, no such right of control was exercised by Wal-Mart. 
As in the parent liability cases presented in the previous section, the court did not discuss the matter 
of Doe v. Wal-Mart within the framework of the right to just working conditions and more 
specifically the right to sufficient remuneration, safe and healthy working conditions, or reasonable 
limitation of working hours. Although the United States has not ratified the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, domestic courts should orient themselves to the OECD 
Guidelines and the UNGP to define the scope of due diligence that subcontracting companies 
should apply in future similar cases. By that standard, subcontracting companies and parent 
companies should exercise leverage.131 In supply chains, this leverage depends on circumstances 
such as the structure and complexity of the chain or the market position of the enterprise vis-à-vis 
its suppliers.132 These are the criteria that should guide a judge and not, as in Doe v. Wal-Mart, 
criteria such as whether a code of conduct has been adopted or whether a corporation exercises an 
immediate level of day-to-day authority. 
The ongoing German proceeding Jabir et al v. KiK might shed light on the liability of 
subcontracting companies to ensure safe working conditions under foreign suppliers. In September 
2012, over 250 workers died in a fire at a factory in Pakistan that supplied the German textile 
corporation KiK. In March 2015, four plaintiffs filed a compensation claim against KiK. They 
alleged that KiK, which was buying 70% of the textiles produced by the factory,133 shared a 
responsibility for the fire-safety deficiencies in the Pakistani factory.134 Indeed, although KiK hired 
auditing companies to review safety conditions at the factory,135 the workers could not escape the 
fire.136 In the absence of clear liability rules for subcontracting companies under German law, the 
courts will hopefully clarify the conditions of liability by referring to the international due diligence 
standard of the UNGP and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. 
2.2 Implementing corporate due diligence: from disclosure to liability 
The lack of laws establishing the liability of parent and subcontracting companies for the harm 
caused to employees abroad is a major barrier for victims in accessing remedies. Domestic courts 
may possibly orient themselves to the OECD and UN due diligence standard for parent and 
subcontracting companies to establish liability. Without clear domestic laws, however, workers 
affected abroad in their right to just conditions of work will continue to face high uncertainty related 
to the outcomes of such proceedings. This section presents recent legislative developments aimed 
at closing the accountability gap by incorporating the concept of corporate due diligence into 
domestic laws. These developments are differentiated according to whether they entail mandatory 
disclosure alone or whether they also aim to establish liability rules. 
2.2.1 Implementing due diligence through mandatory disclosure 
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There are at least three legally binding documents that entail disclosure requirements for 
multinational corporations operating abroad and relate to the material scope of the right to just 
conditions of work. The first one is the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010.137 
The material scope of the California Act is much narrower than the right to just conditions of work. 
It only encompasses slavery and human trafficking and thus only the most severe violations of that 
right. This Act requires every retail seller and manufacturer doing business in California and having 
worldwide gross receipts that exceed one hundred million dollars to disclose their efforts to 
eradicate slavery and human trafficking from their supply chains.138 The disclosure must be posted 
on the retail seller’s or manufacturer’s internet website.139  
Very similar in scope and purpose, the U.K. Modern Slavery Act 2015140 is also limited to slavery, 
servitude, and forced or compulsory labour, as well as human trafficking, which are all traditional 
criminal offenses. Under part 6, which relates to transparency in supply chains, commercial 
organizations must prepare a slavery and human trafficking statement.141 The statement must 
indicate the steps the organization has taken to ensure that slavery and human trafficking are not 
taking place in any of its supply chains, nor in any part of its own business.142 Among other 
information about due diligence processes, the statement may include information about parts of 
the organization’s business and supply chains where a risk of slavery and human trafficking exists 
and the steps it has taken to address that risk.143  
Finally, the European Union Directive 2014/95 on disclosure of non-financial information requires 
undertakings that exceed 500 employees to present a non-financial statement. The material scope 
of this directive is much broader than the aforementioned statutes and encompasses human rights 
in general, including all four core elements of the right to just conditions of work. Among many 
other elements, the statement should describe due diligence processes implemented144 related to 
employee matters,145 such as gender equality, working conditions, or health and safety at work.146 
The statement should include the principal risks related to those matters connected to the 
undertaking’s operations including, where relevant and proportionate, its business relationships.147 
The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, the U.K. Modern Slavery Act, and the 
European Union Directive 2014/95 do not establish liability rules for parent or subcontracting 
companies. Rather, mandatory disclosure is a means to bridge human rights due diligence and 
human rights reporting.148 Some suggest that mandatory disclosure may influence corporate 
behaviour, even if information that corporations disclose does not lead to any legal sanctions if 
they believe that such information could lead to reputational harm.149 In fact, mandatory disclosure 
may also increase liability, at least to some extent. During the course of civil litigation, it is certain 
that these regulations will make it more difficult for corporations that are subject to them to argue 
that they did not or could not know about employee matters abroad. In that sense, these regulations 
are an important step towards more liability in global operations, although they do not significantly 
reduce the uncertainty related to outcomes of transnational litigation. Only clear liability rules may 
do so. 
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2.2.2 Implementing due diligence through liability rules 
There are ongoing legislative developments in France and Switzerland that aim to establish a 
precise liability rule for parent and subcontracting companies for human rights violations abroad 
beyond mandatory disclosure. In France, members of the Parliament submitted the Law proposal 
relating to the due diligence duty of parent and subcontracting companies.150 The law proposal, as 
adopted by the National Assembly in March 2015, required French corporations to adopt and 
enforce a due diligence plan in order to identify and prevent human rights violations caused by the 
corporation’s own activities, those of its controlled entities and of suppliers with whom it has an 
established business relationship.151 In addition, it established the corporation’s liability in case a 
breach in its due diligence duty causes damage.152 After several back-and-forth exchanges between 
the two Chambers, however, the Senate rejected the liability rule and transformed the obligation of 
adopting and enforcing a due diligence plan into a disclosure requirement.153 The proposal is now 
under discussion at the Mixt Commission, in which the two Chambers will have to come to a final 
agreement or disagreement. 
Turning to the Swiss legislative development, a coalition of 77 organizations from Swiss civil 
society launched the legal federal initiative called Responsible Business: Protecting Human Rights 
and the Environment.154 The initiative collected the requisite threshold of 100,000 signatures and 
will therefore be submitted in 2018 to the Swiss electorate. It aims to add Article 101a, named 
‘responsibility of business’, to the Swiss Constitution. The text of the proposed Article 101a of the 
Swiss Constitution states that companies in Switzerland must respect internationally recognized 
human rights, thus including the right to just conditions of work, and ensure that these rights are 
also respected by companies under their control. In that task, companies are required to carry out 
appropriate due diligence. The text of the initiative further specifies the notion of ‘control’, which 
may also result from the exercise of power in a business relationship.155 The initiative thus 
encompasses not only subsidiaries controlled through a majority of shares but all subsidiaries and 
suppliers upon which a Swiss corporation may exercise practical control.156 
Beyond incorporating into the Constitution the UNGP and OECD concepts of human rights due 
diligence for Swiss parent and subcontracting companies, the initiative also aims to establish a rule 
regarding liability in the event that harm occurs and the corporation fails to prove that it carried out 
appropriate due diligence. The text of the initiative reads as follows:  
Companies are … liable for damage caused by companies under their control where 
they have, in the course of business, committed violations of internationally recognized 
human rights or international environmental standards. They are not liable under this 
provision however if they can prove that they took all due care … to avoid the loss or 
damage, or that the damage would have occurred even if all due care had been taken.157  
Technically, if the Swiss electorate accepts the constitutional initiative, the constitutional rule 
establishing liability for Swiss multinational corporations operating abroad will probably have to 
 20 
be incorporated into the Swiss Code of Obligations. The table below summarizes the adopted and 
proposed regulations that aim to implement due diligence that parent and subcontracting companies 
should apply as regards the human right to just conditions of work. 
  Mandatory 
Disclosure 
Rule 
Regarding 
Liability 
Material Scope In Force 
California Transparency in 
Supply Chains Act of 2010 
Yes No Slavery and human 
trafficking 
Yes 
European Union Directive 
2014/95 
Yes No Human rights, including 
employee matters such as 
gender equality, working 
conditions, or health and 
safety at work 
Yes 
U.K. Modern Slavery Act 2015 Yes No Slavery, servitude, and 
forced or compulsory 
labour 
Yes 
French Law Proposal on the Due-
Diligence Duty of Parent and 
Subcontracting Companies 
Yes ? Human rights No 
Swiss Federal Initiative on 
Responsible Business 
Yes Yes Internationally recognized 
human rights 
No 
 
Conclusion 
It is a fact that international human rights law is evolving towards more accountability for 
multinational corporations for human rights violations in their global operations. The second pillar 
of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights entails a corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights. Within that responsibility, corporations should apply human 
rights due diligence. As also recommended in the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 
corporations should identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their adverse 
human rights impacts in their global operations. Furthermore, United Nations human rights treaty 
bodies increasingly recommend that states ensure that corporations domiciled in their territory are 
held accountable for human rights violations extraterritorially and that victims abroad have access 
to remedies. 
This article illustrates these developments through and applies them to the right to just conditions 
of work. At the universal level, the right to just conditions of work entails four core elements: the 
right to fair, equal, and sufficient remuneration; to safe and healthy working conditions; to equal 
opportunity for promotion; and to rest, leisure, reasonable limitation of work hours and holidays 
with pay. Corporations may impact each element in their extraterritorial day-to-day activities. It is 
thus not a coincidence that Chapter V of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the 
ILO Tripartite Declaration, and General Comment 23 of the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights define specific responsibilities for corporations to respect these core elements. 
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The existence of specific corporate responsibilities to respect the right to just conditions of work 
extraterritorially might remain meaningless without domestic laws to implement them. To date, 
there are no domestic laws establishing the liability of parent or subcontracting companies for the 
harm caused to employees in foreign subsidiaries and suppliers. As a result, domestic courts must 
create criteria based on existing tort law, which is not equipped to assess the conduct of 
multinational enterprises abroad. Despite an emergent case law, the absence of clear rules 
establishing liability proves unsatisfactory as it leads to much legal uncertainty for victims and 
corporations. 
California, the United Kingdom, and the European Union have adopted measures requiring 
corporations to disclose information on how they address specific human rights in their activities 
abroad. Although this is an important step towards liability, it might be insufficient. Disclosure 
requirements do not clarify the central question regarding the liability of parent and subcontracting 
companies. While waiting for domestic legislative initiatives to establish the liability of parent and 
subcontracting companies, such as those currently under discussion in Switzerland or France, 
domestic courts should at least rely on the already existing UNGP and OECD due diligence 
standard to establish the conditions of liability of parent and subcontracting companies for 
violations of the right to just conditions of work in their extraterritorial activities. 
It is probably only a matter of time until this international standard transforms into a binding rule. 
Some countries have already shared their aim to draft a legally binding treaty on business and 
human rights.158 Clear binding obligations have been placed on corporations regarding 
transnational corruption, which were previously mere recommendations. Other than economic 
reasons, there is no reason why obligations to protect workers in global operations should not be 
imposed on multinational corporations. Therefore, the questions are instead as follows: how hard 
will some corporations resist, and how far will states be willing to go to implement these obligations 
domestically? 
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